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  1. FlowFX (flowfx@chaos.social)'s status on Sunday, 08-Jul-2018 19:42:03 CEST FlowFX FlowFX

    Is http://git-secret.io/ a safe method to store credentials in public Git repositories?

    In conversation Sunday, 08-Jul-2018 19:42:03 CEST from chaos.social permalink
    • MacLemon (maclemon@chaos.social)'s status on Sunday, 08-Jul-2018 19:57:36 CEST MacLemon MacLemon
      in reply to

      @flowfx Conveniently disregards the fact that you must change all passwords after changing access. Since the credentials stored in git include all their history and you could just go back to a commit where you still had access.
      Now you have a password management problem, a git problem, a key distribution problem without meaningful revocation mechanism, and a GPG problem, including a denial of service attack vector for pull requests by changing passwords though a commit.

      Just keep it separate.

      In conversation Sunday, 08-Jul-2018 19:57:36 CEST permalink
      FlowFX repeated this.
    • FlowFX (flowfx@chaos.social)'s status on Sunday, 08-Jul-2018 20:03:35 CEST FlowFX FlowFX
      in reply to
      • MacLemon

      @MacLemon Thank you.

      In conversation Sunday, 08-Jul-2018 20:03:35 CEST permalink
    • Henryk Plötz (henryk@chaos.social)'s status on Monday, 09-Jul-2018 10:56:01 CEST Henryk Plötz Henryk Plötz
      in reply to
      • MacLemon

      @MacLemon @flowfx To be fair, though, that's a general point on *all* password sharing mechanismus. (See also: https://www.passwordstore.org/)

      Inherently, it's impossible to rescind knowledge.

      A dishonest authorized user can always just make a copy/memorize everything. Git just makes this slightly easier by automatically providing old copies.

      In conversation Monday, 09-Jul-2018 10:56:01 CEST permalink
      FlowFX repeated this.
    • MacLemon (maclemon@chaos.social)'s status on Monday, 09-Jul-2018 11:47:28 CEST MacLemon MacLemon
      in reply to
      • Henryk Plötz

      @henryk I totally agree. Having a public ledger of all the password history, even if encrypted, puts up a great level of attack surface, IMHO. I mean, how good do you expect the passwords that protect that thing to be statistically?
      I can just clone the repo and start attacking it offline with as many CPUs I'm willing to afford.
      Keeping the same info in an offline repo allows for versioning likewise and keeps the attack surface lower. I wouldn't risk it.
      @flowfx

      In conversation Monday, 09-Jul-2018 11:47:28 CEST permalink
      FlowFX repeated this.

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